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May 20, 1999 
 
The Asian Economic Crisis: The Way Ahead For Singapore 
by Augustine H H Tan,  
Associate Professor of Economics, National University of Singapore 
President, Economic Society of Singapore 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The current Asian crisis holds many lesso s for Singapore even though our 
economy suffered mildly compared with nations like S. Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Hong Kong. This essay will attempt to explain how and why we got 
affected by the Asian Crisis, what structural problems became evident nd what 
strategies we must pursue to ensure our future prosperity and stability. 
  
II. The Asian Crisis: Trigger Point 
 
The Crisis began with Thailand when the Baht fell dramatically overnight 
[15%] and floated on 2nd July1997. A few observers, includg the IMF, had 
forewarned Thailand that she was headed for trouble, but nobody anticipated the 
severity of the Crisis nor its spread to Indonesia, S. Korea, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. Absolutely nobody imagined that the Asian Crisis would later become a
global one, engulfing Russia and Brazil and threatening others. Even countries with 
strong fundamentals like Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan suffered speculative 
attacks, although in milder degree.  
Thailand’s problems began with the bursting of the asset bubble: property 
prices turned down from 1992 and the Stock Market from 1994. There had been a 
marked lending boom. In 1994 credit extended to the private sector amounted to 
128% of GDP; in 1995, it was 139% and in 1996, 100%! 
With the bursting of the ass t bubble, bank loans collateralized by stocks and 
property became bad: by 1997 such non-performing loans amounted to 15% of bank 
assets. Construction activities declined in 1996. Meanwhile, export growth decelerated 
due to poorer global demand and adverse terms of trade. 
Between June 1995 and June 1997, Thailand’s real effective exchange rate rose 
16.1%, worsening her international competitiveness. As shall be seen later, the undue 
weight of the US$ in the exchange rate pegging system of Asian countries led to ver-
valuation.  Consequently, the current account deficit increased to 7.9% of GDP in 1996, 
providing one of the trigger points of the Crisis. The debt exposure of Thailand was 
also inordinately high. The debt-equity ratio of corporations rose to 2.3, the second 
highest in Asia [next to S. Korea]. The banking system was highly vulnerable as foreign 
liabilities amounted to one-third of the money supply [M2] while short-t rm external 
debt increased to almost 150% of foreign exchange reserves. 
Against he former backdrop of rapidly weakening fundamentals, the Central 
Bank of Thailand made two terrible blunders in early 1997. The first was to bail out 
financial institutions which had gone bust. The second was to compromise Thailand’s 
foreign exchange resrves in a vain attempt to defend the Baht via forward operations. 
Both actions resulted in the loss of virtually all her foreign exchange reserves and 
pumped up liquidity unduly, guaranteeing the free fall of the Baht. 
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III. Explanations For The Crisis 
Explanations for the Crisis fall into three broad categories: factors causing the 
loss of international competitiveness, domestic governance issues and imperfections in 
international capital markets.  
 The East and South-East Asian economies became very competitive aft r the 
Plaza Accord of September 1985 which devalued the US dollar by some 50% against 
the Yen. Officially their currencies were pegged to a basket of currencies: de facto, the 
US dollar carried a weight in excess of 75 percent.1 This meant that the Asian 
economies became more competitive whenever the dollar weakened and lost 
competitiveness when it strengthened. In late 1995, the Yen depreciated 30% against 
the dollar and continued to weaken. Earlier in early 1994, the Chinese Yuan was 
devalued 35%.2 There was also a large deterioration in the terms of trade in the 
nineties.3 The early nineties also saw the emergence of several new actors on the global 
market, viz., the former members of the Soviet Union, Latin America, some African 
countries and India. Since 1990 the Japanese economy had been stagnating as a result 
of the unwise deflation of the property bubble, and in the months preceding the Asian 
Crisis, it weakened significantly. Moreover, the electronics industry was in a downturn 
from 1996 until last year. In the summer of 1997 there were also expectations of a 
monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve Bank. The impact of all these factors 
undoubtedly severely eroded the competitiveness of the Asian economies. 
 Most analysts focus instead on domestic governance issues in the Asian 
countries. Asian fiscal and monetary policies were largely conservative, unlike Latin 
American countries: budgets were generally in surplus and Asian inflation was mild. 
Sovereign debt, with one or two exceptions, was not a serious problem. The real 
problems had to do with overly hasty financial liberalization and opening up of the 
capital account. A number of serious consequences emerged. Together with the impact 
of the Plaza Accord, liberalization resulted in huge capital inflows. Undue credit 
creation took place, even though attempts were made at sterilization. The pegging of 
the exchange rates [with the overwhelming weight of the US dollar noted earlier] 
under such circumstances meant widening interest rate differentials wh ch encouraged 
even more unhedged capital inflow, especially of a short-term nature. 
 Overly rapid financial liberalization also resulted in the proliferation of banks 
and other financial institutions. Central banks lost valuable key personnel and were 
unable to exercise proper supervision, make assessment and manage financial risks. 
Moreover, there was lack of transparency in the accounting system of financial 
institutions and corporations: financial and economic data became unreliable. 
 Economic theorists must share part of the blame too.4  The increasing current 
account deficits did not alarm observers unduly because they did not stem from public 
sector excess spending but were the result of private sector investments. The theorists 
had failed to see the vulnerability to a sudden foreign capital withdrawal. They had also 
failed to see the over-exuberant investments in real estate and infrastructure, which led 
to the collapse of asset markets. 
 Another governance issue faulted was that on cronyism, collusion and 
corruption which supposedly led to excessive lending and excessive risk-taking, 
especially in unproductive, rent-se king enterprises. However, somehow the Asian 
countries in question had managed to grow rapidly for over thirty years in spite of such 
a system. This is not to endorse the evil but rather to question whether it was a major 
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causative factor in the Crisis or whether it represented a fault-li e which exacerbated 
the Crisis. 
 Other analysts downplay the importance of the erosion of international 
competitiveness and the problem of poor domestic governance. Instead they attribute 
more blame to the structural deficiencies of the international capital market for the 
suddenness, contagion, severity and persistence of the Crisis.5 Stud nts ofinternational 
economics have long recognized that short-term capital flows are extremely large in 
relation to trade flows and foreign exchange reserves of countries and that, in the 
short-run, exchange rates are determined more by capital flows than by the trade 
account. The extreme volatility is also well known. The Asian countries had become 
too dependent on foreign short-term capital. They were, in effect, borrowing short 
from abroad and investing long domestically, without hedging for currency risks. This 
process brought about a triple risk situation: currency mismatch, maturity mismatch 
and credit risk. Like a typical bank operation, a bank can be solvent but not liquid, 
precisely because it borrows short to lend long--a perfectly normal financial 
intermediation. It is also well known that a run on a bank can occur even if no question 
of solvency arises. A crisis of confidence in a solvent bank is readily resolved by the 
Central Bank which steps in with the necessary liquidity  injection. Unfortunately, no 
such mechanism exists to help a country which borrows short from abroad to invest 
long at home. The IMF is not a lender of last resort: it was never set up to do so and 
its resources are far too slender to permit such an operation. Consequently, as for the 
Asian countries, a panic pullout of short-term capital meant a triple deflation of assets: 
currency [devaluation], stocks and property. Debts denominated in foreign currencies 
balloon with the devaluation, domestic assets get severely deflated: consequ ntly non-
performing loans increase enormously, ruining balance sheets and sending the financial 
system into a tail-spin. In such a situation, the extreme of which was experienced by 
Indonesia, even trade credit dried up. Meanwhile international credit rang agencies 
downgrade its financial institutions so much so that even letters of credit issued by its 
banks are worthless. No wonder then that a severe domestic recession sets in, 
requiring three to five years for recovery. Costs of repairing financial institutio s can 
amount to 40-5  percent of GDP. 
 Yet other analysts have questioned whether the rescue operations of the IMF 
made matters worse. In the first place, it is argued that the latter applied the same 
patent medicine of fiscal and monetary contraction which was inappropriate because 
the Asian countries did not have irresponsible macro-economic policies. Their 
problems, as pointed out above, were brought about by the private sector borrowing 
too much from abroad on a short-term basis. The IMF-mandated fiscal and monetary 
stringencies and too rapid closure of financial institutions created panic resulting in 
capital flight and exacerbated the insolvency of corporations and others. To be fair to 
the IMF, it later eased up on fiscal and monetary policis. More rucial was the failure 
or inability of the IMF to help the afflicted countries sort out their short-term foreign 
indebtedness, thereby prolonging the agony. S. Korea benefited from the intervention 
of the US Secretary of the Treasury who reportedly arm-twisted global banks to roll 
over the loans, thus giving it time and space to resolve the Crisis. Poor Indonesia is still 
struggling to restructure private sector foreign debts, nearly two years into the Crisis. 
Meanwhile, millions lost their jobs and some 25 million people have been pushed 
below the poverty line in Indonesia alone. That poor country is teetering on the brink 
of social and political chaos. 
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IV. Contagion 
Another critical issue in the analysis of the Asian Crisis is that of contagion. 
Why did the Crisis spread so rapidly from Thailand to Indonesia, to S. Korea, Malaysia 
and the Philippines? Why did it also affect, though in much lesser degree, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Singapore? 
When the Thai Baht fell on 2nd July 1997, neither the IMF nor the US Treasury 
saw any threat of contagion. Japan offered US$100 billion to set up an Asian Monetary 
Fund but this was reportedly vetoed by the US because it did not want Japan to 
increase its influence in Asia. Ironically and somewhat belatedly, Japan is now giving 
US$30 billion to the afflicted countries. 
The Crisis then spread to Malaysia [14th July], Singapore [17th July], Indonesia 
[13th August], Hong Kong [15th August], the Philippines [4th September], Taiwan [14th
October] and S. Korea [8th November]. Of particular concern to Singapore is why and 
how it got affected by the Crisis. Singapore is well known for its Budget surpluses and 
excess private savings, both of which result in an annual current surplus of 15 percent 
or so of GDP. Singapore has no sovereign external debt. Its internal debt is merely the 
reflection of reshuffling of funds between Statutory Boards via the Treasury.  
For Singapore, interest rate differentials have historically meant lower domestic 
rates because the twin surpluses mentioned arlier, together with substantial capital 
inflows, especially of FDI, have meant currency appreciation. Hence Singapore 
corporations and financial institutions had not been substantially exposed to short-term 
foreign debts, as were the afflicted Asian countries. The contagion Singapore suffered 
came via trade and financial links as well as the behaviour of international investors.  
Fifty percent of Singapore's trade is with Asian countries including Japan. 
Singapore banks had substantial exposure to the region as well. Singaporeans had 
invested in stocks and property in the region. Moreover, the behaviour of international 
portfolio investors provided three channels of contagion.6
The first channel is herd behaviour: because of asymmetric information, fund 
managers follow investment trends of other investors to protect themselves from blame 
in the event of losses. The reward system for fund managers apparently make them 
especially prone to this. Alternatively, they may regard emerging markets as an asset 
class, regardless of differing fundamentals: this obviously at the disadvantage of 
Singapore. A second channel is portfolio allocation: any shock to one emerging 
market's returns will contribute to changes in allocation to all other emerging markets. 
A third channel is portfolio interdependence: losses in one market will cause fund 
managers to sell out in other markets to meet contingent investor redemptions. It 
should be noted that small shifts in industrial countries' portfolios result in inflows and 
outflows that are large in relation to emerging markets whose bourses are small in 
capitalization and most of whose stocks are usually thinly traded. 
Investors from the region too undoubtedly contributed to the asset deflation. 
Heavy losses incurred in one coutry led them to sell out in markets that were still 
relatively unscathed. Hence stocks in Singapore suffered a sell-o f when markets 
plunged in Thailand and Indonesia. 
Banks in Singapore had substantial exposure to the region: consequently their 
bad debts increased as currencies and assets deflated in the region.  
Singapore is also Southeast Asia's entrepot. Moreover, nearly 55% of her 
commodity exports go to East and Southeast Asia. The region is also a major market 
for Singapore's exports of services, especially in the areas of tourism and finance. It is 
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easy to see why Singapore suffered when the financially crippled Asian countries 
drastically reduced their imports. 
 
V. Impact On Singapore 
 The Singapore economy was clearly affected by the Crisis, though much less 
than others in the region, with the exception of Taiwan. Overall, the growth rate 
plunged from 8 percent in 1997 to only 1.5 percent in 1998. Technically, the economy 
slipped into recession in the last two quarters of 1998, recovering by 1.2 percent in the 
first quarter of 1999. Commerce was the worst hit, followed by manufacturing and 
construction. Transport and communications was the most resilient sector while 
financial and business services came through fairly well in 1998, slipping marginally in 
the first quarter of this year. 
 The unemployment rate rose from a normal of 2 percent to 4.4 percent last 
December, easing a little to 3.9 percent in March this year. 
 From Chart 1 below, it can be seen that the Sing$ fell nearly 19 percent against 
the US$ between June 1997 and August 1998. As at April 1999, it was still down 16.7 
percent. 
 Chart 2 shows the real effective exchange rate of the Sing$ which adjusted 
downwards by about 8 percent from June 1997. This smaller depreciation in real 
effective terms reflects the effect of trade weights and the much greater depreciations 
of the other Asian currencies, particularly Indonesia's [- 35%], Thailand's [- 18.6%], S. 
Korea's [- 16%], and Malaysia's [-35 %]. Hong Kong, on the other hand, because of its 
currency board system which pegged the HK$ rigidly to the US$, had a real effective 
exchange rate appreciation of nearly 10 percentage points between June 1997 and 
August 1998 but subsequently depreciated by 1.9 percent. Consequently, Hong Kong's 
economy had to absorb a greater shock than Singapore's: in 1998, the former's 
economic growth was - 5.2 percent, compared to Singapore's +1.5 percent. 
 Singapore's Stock Market also suffered severe deflation of -47 percent [from 
July 9, 1997 to August 5 1998] compared to -49 percent for Hong Kong and only -20 
percent for Taiwan for the same period. The sharp downturn had significant adverse 
effects on the banking sector [increase in non-p rforming loans], wealth [decrease in 
consumption and investment] and, equally important, confidence. It should be noted 
that market capitalization of traded equities is substantially more important for 
1998 1999
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Annual Q1
Total 6.2 1.6 -0.6 -0.8 1.5 1.2
Manufacturing 6.5 -0.4 -4.2 -2.7 -0.5 6.5
Construction 15.5 7.9 -0.2 -5.3 3.9 -9
Commerce 0.9 -4.5 -5.9 -6.3 -4 -2.1
Transport & Communications6.9 6.3 4.1 4.7 5.5 5.7
Financial & Business Services6.6 2.2 1.8 2.1 3.1 -0.6
Source: Ministry of Trade & Industry, Singapore, First Quarter 1999 Economic Survey of Singapore
Table 1
Gross Domestic Product at 1990 Market Prices
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Singapore than for the US or Japan: in 1993, it was 254 percent of GDP compared to 
only 82 percent for the US and 71 percent for Japan.7 For the period 1980 to 1998, 
capital gains and losses from the Stock Market ranged between -91 percent to +145 
percent of GDP! 
 The Crisis also impacted property prices in Singapore. Although the decline 
had already begun in 1996 with the anti-sp culation measures of the Government, the 
property price index fell another 35 percent last year. 
 The triple asset deflation of currency, stocks and property adversely affected 
the economy directly via the increase of non-performing loans from about 2 percent in 
1997 to between 8 and 12 percent. Fortunately, the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
requires a capital adequacy ratio of 12 percent for banks while the latter actually hold 
about 16-17 percent. These provisions stood Singapore in good stead during the 
Crisis. Nevertheless, the fear of rising non-performing loans caused the banks to 
tighten credit: increasing interest rate spreads and decreasing loan-deposit ratios. 
Domestic demand was consequently dampened, contributing to the recession. 
  
Chart 1 
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Chart 2 
 
VI. Short-Term Strategy 
The Singapore Government responded to the Crisis by a series of measures. 
The 1998-99 Budget announced in February 1998 clearly underestimated the Crisis. 
The income tax rebate of 5 percent on individual income tax was half th t given for the 
previous year. The Budget was not designed to be anti-recessio  in terms of a 
stimulatory deficit: instead, the projected surplus was $7.27 billion! Tax incentives 
were given to promote fund management, the Bond Market among others for the 
financial sector. The only measures having a direct bearing on the Crisis were a 
property tax rebate of 15 percent for commercial and industrial properties [from July 
1998], property tax exemption for land under development for a period of up to five 
years, and abolishment of stamp duties on all instruments except for those relating to 
stocks and shares and immovable properties [from February 1998]. 
The deceleration of the economy during the second quarter of 1998 prompted 
the Government to introduce a thr e-pronged off-budget package worth approximately 
$2 billion, designed to alleviate the Crisis. The first was aimed at reducing business 
costs: additional property tax rebate of 40 percent on commercial and industrial 
property, rental rebates by JurongTow  Corporation and Housing and Development 
Board by up to 20 percent. The Civil Aviation Authority extended a rebate on the 
rentals of its office, warehouse and retail tenants [15 percent] and concessions on 
airport fees. Telecommunications, power and port charges were also reduced. The 
second prong was to accelerate and bring forward development projects, expand the 
Skills Redevelopment Programme, provide sufficient capital to local enterprises via the 
Local Enterprise Financing Scheme; additional funds were also given to the Economic 
Development Board's Economic Development Assistance Scheme and the Trade 
Development Board. To help absorb graduates and also to expand the education 
Singapore: Real Effective Exchange Rate
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system, more teachers were recruited. The third prong was aimed at stabilization of 
specific sectors. Government land sales were suspended until the end of 1999, stamp 
duty on uncompleted properties was deferred until Temporary Occupation Permit or 
sale. Developers were also allowed to reassign land parcels bought from Government. 
Penalties for delays in project completion were suspended for up to 8 years. To help 
the banking sector, the 3 percent limit on tax deduction for general provisions was 
lifted, subject to case by case approval. Hotels were encouraged to upgrade via a tax 
allowance of up to 150 percent of approved refurbishment. 
The most significant move made by the Government, however, was the Cost 
Reduction Package worth $10.5 billion, introduced in November last year, which 
aimed to reduce business costs by 15 percent. Wages were cut by between 15-18
percent, with 10 percent from the Central Provident Fund contribution by employers 
[from 20 to 10 percent]. The foreign workers levy for skilled workers was reduced 
from $100 to $30 while that for unskilled workers was reduced by $90 for 
manufacturing, marine and services. A corporate tax rebate of 10 percent was also 
announced. Industrial and commercial rentals were further reduced. Port, airport 
charges, telecommunications and utility rates were also lowered or extended. 
The two off-budget packages turned the projected 1998 Budget surplus into a 
small deficit of $466 million, barely 0.3 percent of GDP. Although this was less 
deflationary than the usual previous budget surpluses [2-6 perc nt of GDP], there was 
not the fiscal stimulus needed to offset the two quarters of recession last year. 
Nevertheless, the direct cost-cutting measures improved the competitiveness of our 
industries. 
Real fiscal stimulus came only in February 1999, nearly 20 months into the 
Crisis! For fiscal year 1999 beginning April, the projected Budget deficit is $5.05 
billion, about 3.5 percent of GDP. Revenue shortfall, arising from the November cost-
cutting measures and other tax concessions plus the impact of the recession, accounts 
for the bulk of the deficit while development expenditure increased by $1.2 billion, or 
10 percent. The Budget also doubled the personal income tax rebate to 10 percent and 
provided corresponding rebates on conservancy and utilities for HDB households. 
Various tax incentives and exemptions were provided to boost the bond market, the 
finance sector, global OHQs, contract manufacturers, logistics, conference organizers 
and offshore oil activities. 
How helpful were the short-term measures to deal with the Crisis? The main 
criticism must be that the measures were taken rather late into the Crisis. In February 
last year I was urging the Government to undertake cost-cutting and budgetary 
measures8. Such measures should be preemptive, not reactive! The Government view 
was that it did not want to impose unnecessary hardship on workers by cost-cutting 
without firm evidence of recession. This view was unfortunately reinforced by most 
observers' underestimate of the seriousness of the Crisis. There is also a prevalent view 
among Government economists that, since external demand normally accounts for 
two- thirds total demand, it is useless to stimulate domestic demand. Moreover, in 
their opinion, since the Singapore economy is highly open, with total exports 
accounting for 135 percent of GDP, there is too much import leakage for any domestic 
stimulus to work significantly. In my opinion, keeping the economy afloat even at 2 or 
3 percent by stimulating domestic demand is still worth it. This is not, however, to 
argue for habitual pump-priming which creates problematic perennial budget deficits. 
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VII. Recovery 
As noted earlier, the first quarter GDP growth rate was 1.2 percent over the 
same period a year ago. The recovery is led by manufacturing, particularly electronics 
and chemicals. The question has been raised as to whether the recovery is only a flash 
in the pan or will be sustained. I believe it will be sustained and that the growth will 
exceed the Government forecast of 0-2 percent. It will more likely be 3-5 percent. My 
reasons are as follows: the next three quarters' growth will be measured against 
substantially lower growth rates for the corresponding previous quarters. Moreover, 
the Stock Market has recovered vigourously and the property market is reviving with 
strong sales and increasing pr ces. Finance, business services, retail and the property 
sectors should benefit. The afflicted Asian economies are also recovering faster than 
expected even as they repair their devastated financial systems and rebuild their 
corporations. Since Singapore's trade with the region is about 55 percent of her total, 
domestic and re-exports to the region should increase in tandem. There are already 
signs of recovery in tourism. 
The fears that are often expressed about the recovery have to do with a 
potential bursting of the Stock Market bubble in Wall Street, with a US recession 
brought about by declining consumer spending. My view is that it is not a question of 
the Bubble bursting but the US Federal Reserve's response to such an event. 
Institutional memory of the monetary contraction associated with the Great Depression 
plus the more recent happier responses to the 1987 Crash and last year's Long-Term 
Capital Management Crisis should be helpful in anticipating better bubble management. 
A soft landing for the US economy would be more likely.
There is also fear that, shortly, the Federal Reserve would raise interest rates 
and cause an abortion of the Asian recovery. I believe that, although such moves 
would curb Stock Market exuberance here and elsewhere, the impact on the real 
economy would be minimal. The Asian economies have been suffering from badly 
damaged financial systems. The reforms and re-capitalization of banks are enabling 
them to import and export: there should be enough momentum for recovery, although, 
from past experience of  currency and banking crises elsewhere, full recovery is still 2-
3 years away. 
Another reason for optimism is the Japanese economy. The reforms and re-
structuring of banks there plus the fiscal stimulus and monetary expansion should result 
in some growth shortly. At least, catastrophe has been averted. 
The launching of the Euro earlier this year should be helpful to the EU: there 
should be efficiency and economies of scale gains that should help offset the structural 
rigidity for the next 5-10 years. 
Closer to home, the biggest anxiety is Indonesia: whether the June election will 
produce a stable government or anarchy.
VIII. Medium and Long-Term Strategy 
Looking beyond the Crisis, what are the prospects for the Singapore economy? 
With a per capita GNP of US$22,191 what kind of growth rate can we expect? 
On the positive side, Singapore is a totally urban economy unlike the normal industrial 
country: hence our growth potential should be measured against cities like New York, 
London etc.9 Moreover, our labour productivity and total factor productivity [TFP] 
indicate that there is still ample room to catch up with the more advanced countries. 
TFP estimates for Singapore are generally low, close to zero, or even negative.10 
Productivity improvement measures should be focussed on local enterprises, 
particularly in the non-traded goods and services sectors. Local enterprises in the 
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manufacturing, commerce and services sectors accounted for 72 percent of 
employment and 61 percent of value-added in 1996.11 Local small and medium scale 
enterprises provided 47 percent of employment but only 29 percent of value-added! 
The room for productivity improvement is obvious--part c larly for small and medium 
scale firms. The construction industry, for example, is very inefficient compared to 
Australia and the quality leaves much room for improvement. What is paid for 
renovation in Singapore for a modest house can pay for a beautiful bungalow in 
Australia inclusive of land. 
It is well-known, that, in the process of economic development, non-traded 
goods and services rise in price. Without corresponding productivity increases, the 
price increases would be greater. Consequently, the traded goods and services sectors 
become uncompetitive. It is therefore not sufficient to pay at ention only to the latter 
while ignoring the former. The Asian Crisis illustrates the problem. The boom in traded 
goods and services exports caused the prices of non-traded g ods and services to rise, 
e.g. property. This triggered a further capial inflow. The local currency appreciated. 
The Central Bank attempts to limit the appreciation and sterilizes the resultant 
liquidity. This increased the interest rate differential, causing further capital inflow, 
with disastrous consequences. Analysts have pinned the blame on the pegging of Asian 
currencies. However, if exchange rates had floated, the process described above would 
have caused Asian currencies to appreciate because of the capital inflow induced by 
rising non-traded goods and services price. The appreciation would have made traded 
goods and services uncompetitive, resulting in a current account deficit, with lower 
growth rates or stagnation. The key to preventing or ameliorating both processes -
described above is to improve productivity in he no-traded goods and services 
sectors. Exchange rate flexibility may prevent a currency crisis but cannot prevent 
lower growth rates or stagnation. 
Another cause for reflection is the structure of the Singapore economy. 
Government [including Statutory B ards] plus Government-Linked Companies 
[GLCs] account for 60 percent of the economy while MNCs control 80 percent of 
manufacturing. By way of contrast, Taiwan is more dependent on small and medium-
scale enterprises: for example in manufacturing, such enterprises account for 59 
percent of employment and 56 percent of value-added.12 
The Far Eastern Economic Review13 has noted that, in Singapore, the best and 
brightest graduates are deployed in the public sector or else they go to the MNCs and 
GLCs. It also stated that Singapore banks are risk averse while local investors 
preferred the safety of the property market. Taiwan, on the other hand, seemed to 
produce more entrepreneurs, had more venture capital and emphasized R&D, in the 
process, developing a broadly diversified electronics industry that dwarfs Singapore's. 
Recognizing this, the Singapore Government recently launched a technopreneurship 
drive together with a US$1 billion venture capital fund. If successful, the programme 
should help redress the economi imbalance and help make the Singapore economy 
more vibrant. 
 Singapore also needs to deal with the problem of upgrading skills for the 
workers above 40, many of whom have little education. When such workers lose their 
jobs they are not easily re-employed even when the economy recovers. Re-training 
requires further investment in basic reading and writing and numeracy skills. 
 Another lesson from the Crisis may be for Singapore to diversify its export 
destinations beyond Asia, as currently about 55 percent go to East and Southeast Asia. 
One reason for Taiwan's better performance during the Crisis may be because it is less 
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dependent on the region [41 percent; 29 percent excluding China]. Latin America is 
under- epresented in our exports [1.7 percent] and exports to the EU could be 
increased beyond the current 14 percent. 
 Singapore's outward investments in the region including China have tended to 
be in industrial parks and real estate, both of which are easily vulnerable to political 
and economic changes. By way of contrast, Taiwan's outward investments have been 
more in manufacturing and, consequently more dynamic and profitable. Singapore 
needs to pay more attention to the bottom-line in her investments abroad. 
 Domestically, under the Industry 21 initiative14, he industrial sector will be 
widened to include R&D, product design and development, process engineering, 
testing and market research. The aim is to achieve world-class capability as well as to 
diversify manufacturing to achieve greater stability. 
 Despite the Crisis, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has pushed ahead to 
liberalize the financial market, to make it more competitive. The Stock Exchange and 
Banks will face more foreign competition and higher standards of disclosure.15 The 
MAS is also actively promoting fund management and developing a long-term bond 
market. The latter is a very important move as much of Asian savings are invested 
outside the region while foreign funds are solicited for domestic investment and 
financing. The Crisis has shown the vulnerability that such a practice can produce. 
Singapore is clearly committed to globalization with a vengeance, despite the risks. It 
is clearly banking on good governance to keep currency and banking crises at bay. The  
resilience of its economy during the Asian Crisis shows that the confidence is not 
misplaced. The strategies outlined above should assure Singapore of a good future. 
  
  
                                         
 
 
 
1 Takagi [1996] 
2 The IMF has argued that, because of the unofficial currency market, the effective 
devaluation was much less [Noland et.al. p.13]. I believe, however, that the 
rationalization of the currency market would have boosted foreign investments and 
exports. Black markets do exact transaction costs which may not be exactly small.
3 [Park & Song, p.7] and [CPR1998, p.2] 
4 See for example [Corden 1994]
5 [Radelet & Sachs, 1998] 
6 [Kamisky & Schmukler, 1998; World Bank, 1998/99, p.48] 
7 [Feldman & Kumar, 1995, Table 1] 
8 [Tan, 1998] 
9 [Wan, 1999] 
10 [Young 1992; Sarel 1996; Hsieh 1998] 
11 Economic Survey of Singapore 1998, p.70. 
12 The corresponding figures for Singapore manufacturing are 32 and 16 percent 
respectively. 
13 August 6, 1998 
14 Straits Times, 14 June 1998. 
15 Straits Times, 27 May and 13 August, 1999. 
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